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IV.—A POSTHUMOUS CHAPTER BY J. S. MILL-
BY CABVETH BEAD.
THE first number of the Oxford and Cambridge Review (June,
1907) contains a paper by J. S. Mill found amongst his
effects in the house in which he died at Avignon. It is
entitled On Social Freedom : or the Necessary Limits of Indivi-
dual Freedom Arising out of the Conditions of our Social Life ;
and it expresses at least one opinion so much at variance
with the teaching that is familiar to us in his classical works
as to call for some elucidation.
According to the best judgment I can form, this paper
On Social Freedom, is the introductory chapter of a projected
volume on the evil influence of " conventionality or conven-
tional propriety " in overpowering our personal moral sense
or reason : showing how much heavier and more degrading
is our bondage to this uncentralised authority than to public
law and political government. At the close of his Autobio-
graphy Mill tells us that he has " commenced the"preparation
of matter forfuture books " ; and here perhaps we have the
beginning of one of them. He speaks more than once of " this
work" : a term which would have been hardly suitable for
an essay of less than thirty pages. Probably, again, it is only
a first draught, as the composition is in some respects un-
finished; and we learn from his Autobiography that all his
books were " written at least twice over " ; that in the first
draught he attended chiefly to the arrangement of his sub-
ject and left the elaboration of details for the stage of re-
vision. We may, I think, infer further from the occasional
diffuseness of illustration, disclaimers of any attempt at
precise or-recondite inquiry, and even a certain lightness,
not to say playfulness of expression, that the work was
intended to be popular and rhetorical, or exoteric; whilst
more particularly addressed to those who might agree with
him in a certain opinion, or feeling, namely, " that some
motives are higher, and others lower ". And thus we may
explain why in treating of certain ethical questions he makes
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A POSTHUMOUS CHAPTEB BY J. S. MILL. 75
no reference to his own fuller treatment of them in former
works.
For instance, speaking, at the outset, of the immediate or
spontaneous sense of freedom that we all have, Mill says:
" I believe that it is not very difficult to set forth what will
appear vastly like a demonstration of this proposition : That
human freedom is altogether an illusion or a fiction, that
every a;t of every human creature is absolutely determined
by unalterable laws. I will honestly confess that I am
wholly unable to furnish anything like a satisfactory refuta-
tion of the arguments that may be urged against the exist-
ence of human individual freedom." There is no reference
to the discussion of freedom either in his work on Hamilton
(chap, xxvi.), or in his Logic (VI., ii.), though it has always
seemed to me that he had there given a very satisfactory refu-
tation of mechanical determinism. He goes on: "At the
same time I do not hesitate to affirm that there is no sane
being who can adopt and consistently carry out this doctrine.
It appears to me that every reasonable act of every sane man
is a practical assertion of the existence of individual freedom."
Later in the chapter we read : " That man seems to me to
act with freedom who yields to the influence of the highest
motive which demands his obedience, or which presents
itself to his consciousness at the moment of determination ".
As there is nothing in this contrary to the doctrines of the
Logic, I can only suppose that he refrained from alluding
to that work in the belief that it might be incongruous with
the more popular treatment that he was now contemplating.
It has indeed occurred to me to wonder whether this paper
On Social Freedom is really Mill's own ; but upon that point
Miss Taylor, who has sanctioned its publication, is the best
possible judge.
What has interested me most, however, is the doctrine here
set forth of motives and their place in ethics. Mill proposes
to measure the degree of a man's freedom by the elevation of
the motive from which he acts ; he even regards the recog-
nition of a scale of motives as necessary to ethics. " It
might possibly be a matter of no small difficulty to determine
fully and completely which of all the motives that ever
influence human actions are higher and which are lower—
to arrange all motives of human action in a scale, showing
their relative degrees of moral worthiness or unworthiness.
This is a problem of which I shall not here attempt the
complete solution, since it is not my present purpose to
complete the extremely imperfect science of Ethics. But I
am strongly convinced that, unless human motives can be
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76 CABVETH BEAD:
thus arranged in a moral scale, there can never be any such
science as ethics at all, or any approach made to the con-
struction of such a science. I think that we may at least
take one step towards the formation of such a scale of human
motives, in placing the animal appetites at its lowest ex-
tremity, as being, of all the motives that can influence human
conduct, and which are not actually vicious, the lowest and
meanest." How far this passage departs from the position
of the Utilitarianism will be seen on recalling the well-known
passage in chapter ii., where we read that " utilitarian
moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming
that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the
action, though much with the worth of the agent". That
motives do not affect the morality of the action but that they
do affect the worth of the agent, is enforced in a long foot-
note, and further explained in the dissertation on Bentham.
The morality of an action, of course, he says, depends upon
the intention, that is, the foreseen consequences in pleasure
and pain. Ethics, therefore, as distinct from the apprecia-
tion of character, must, upon this principle, be a science of
intentions not of motives, and must be quite independent of
the arrangement of motives in a moral scale (which, perhaps,
involves a fallacious circle).
It was not, however, this apparent change of opinion that
struck me so much as the extension it gives to a resem-
blance that I have often noticed between Mill's Ethics and
Hutcheson's. , Mill says, that if there is any principle of
morals intuitively obligatory it must be a regard for the
pleasures and pains of others; and Hutcheson says that the
moral sense judges that with equal degrees of Happiness
expected the value of an action is in proportion to the
number of persons affected: Mill, that the end is to secure
happiness to all mankind, and not to them only, but, so far
as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation;
and Hutcheson, that the aim is the greatest happiness of the
greatest number of rationals or sensitive natures : Mill qualifies
the Benthamist doctrine of pleasure by maintaining that
pleasures differ in kind, and that our choice is determined
fey a sense of dignity; and Hutcheson holds that pleasures
differ in duration and intenseness or dignity—without ever
explaining what he means by " dignity " : Mill proposes that
the test of quality shall be the preference felt by those who
by their opportunities of experience, to which must be added
their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are
best furnished with the means of comparison - Hutcheson
says those alone are capable of judging who have experienced
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all the several kinds of pleasure and have their senses acute
and fully exercised in them all. • So far the parallel ran
before the publication- of the essay on Social Freedom; and
this supplies a further resemblance; for whilst Mill demands
the recognition of a scale of motives, Hutcheson actually
proposes one, placing at the bottom of those that have any
moral worth " turbulent " motives towards the good of others,
and th.ui, in ascending ranks, "calm" good will toward par-
ticular persons, toward systems (family or CDuntry), and
toward all rational or sensitive natures. This idea has been
most fully developed by Martineau in Types of Ethical Theory,
and criticised by Sidgwick in Methods of Ethics (bk. iii.,
chap. xii.). Martineau's work was published in 1885, after
Mill's death. Hutcheson, indeed, does not regard the scale
of motives as affecting the good or evil of actions ; that must
depend upon the event: except that "actions are not to be
judged good or evil by the events any farther than they
might have been foreseen or were intended "—another point
of resemblance to Utilitarianism.
Now so many coincidences can hardly be accidental. The
proposal to test the quality of pleasure by invoking the wise
man, or a committee of wise men, might, of course, be traced
to Plato; and it is possible that in every case Mill was draw-
ing from his own spring and not from another's cistern. I
do not remember that he ever mentions Hutcheson, and he
was incapable of deliberate plagiarism. It seems to me,
therefore, that he must have devoured Hutcheson in his
omnivorous youth and forgotten it, though some ideas then
assimilated entered into the tissue of his later thoughts.
Hutcheson has an obvious ground for his scale of motives:
the end being the greatest Happiness, every disposition is
more virtuous as it aims more directly at that mark; but
Mill declines to give any discriminating reason: " The fact
to which I would appeal is that we—meaning those persons
to whom this work is mainly addressed—have a strong and
unmistakable/eeZiragr that some motives are higher, and others
lower. This feeling we who experience it are no more bound
to explain or account for, in order to justify our acting upon
it, than we are bound to account for the distinctions of
colour in order to justify our selecting our draperies accord-
ing to their tints or patterns." Is not this appeal to a
special class, not only for sympathy but as the tribunal of
conduct, strangely unlike the persuasive public utterance that
we are accustomed to from Mill ? It is possible that Social
.Freedom signifies by one or two of its features an extensive-
change of the author's opinions. Changes greater or less
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78 c. BEAD: A POSTHTJMOI/S CHAPTER BY J. S. MILL.
had always been going on in his mind since the early days
when he read Wordsworth and conversed with Maurice.
Bain tells us that " Grote always had a certain misgiving
as to his persistence in the true faith. He would say to me,
' Much as I admire John Mill, my admiration is always
mixed with fear'; meaning that he never knew what un-
expected turn Mill might take. This I regarded as an ex-
aggeration due, in the first instance, to Grote's gloomy
temperament." On the other hand, we do not know at
what date Social Freedom was written; perhaps at some
period when he felt severely the pressure of convention and
the value of high motives. At any rate, it was never, I am
convinced, finished by the author for publication; and the
propriety of publishing fragments, lecture-notes and other
unrevised remains, without the author's sanction, is ex-
tremely questionable. This voice from the grave excites in
all of us a pathetic interest; and on the whole, in my own
mind, its pathetic character is the most abiding.
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